Bay of pigs invasion intelligence failure compared to the sucess of Research Paper

Bay of pigs invasion intelligence failure compared to the sucess of the cuban missle crisis intelligence - Research Paper Example Speculation and the lack of accurate information led to the failure of one and the reliance of accurate intelligence and proper planning led to the success of the other. Bay of Pigs Invasion Intelligence Failure Compared To the Success of the Cuban Missile Crisis Intelligence In 1961, the US attacked Fidel Castrol’s Cuba in a bid to overthrow his government. This attack was that came to be known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, which turned out to be a complete failure. The US had used an attacking force that had received thorough training and aid that was enough to launch a successful attack anywhere (Hughes-Wilson, 2004). Instead, the military operation at the end was a disaster that completely humiliated the US government at the time. The operation also did not achieve its initial objective which was to bring down Fidel Castro and his government. On the contrary the attack only increased the Cuban’s support for their leader (Walton, 2010). The events leading to this inva sion started way back in 1960. The whole process had been well planned from the word go. On March 17 of that year, President Dwight Eisenhower started this elaborate program to get rid of the government of Cuba. The operation was a CIA project from the very beginning. The intelligence body not only provided necessary information on the invasion details, it also recruited and armed Cuban exiles who would carry out the attack. President John F. Kennedy is the one who authorized the failed attempt to oust Castro and his government. Taking a beachhead, establishing a government and gaining US recognition was all part of the plan (Jones, 2008). Some of the reasons associated with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion include: the inability of the US forces to defeat the Cuban air force, the overestimation made by the CIA about the willingness of Cubans to support an armed invasion on their government and the selection of an unfit landing site. Before this invasion the CIA, which the Ei senhower had entrusted with the responsibility of removing Castro from power, had tried many other options to get rid of the president. There were attempts made to poison him, there was support of anticommunist groups in Cuba, and radio broadcasts against the Castro regime were aired to Cuba from Florida. There were even some reports that the CIA made contact with the mafia so that they could work together to get rid of Castro. However, none of these tactics worked, but the CIA was not done yet. They planned and executed the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, but even this adverse action failed (Walton, 2010). The invasion was organized with only 1,297 troops that comprised mostly of Cuban rebels who were not in any position to lead an attack against a formidable military. Within two days, the invasion of the US had been quelled by Castro’s forces and several rebels rounded up. The failure of the CIA during the invasion of Bay of Pigs can be contrasted with the success in which the Cuban Missile crisis was handled. This was another crisis that ha the potential to go awry had the intelligence not been accurate. In fact, a few weeks before the crisis, the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), which was a branch of the CIA, predicted wrongly that the USSR would not place missiles on Cuban soil (Hughes-Wilson, 2004). However, the intelligence gathered after that was enough for the US to plan and identify the missiles before they could be launched. The CIA also gathered enough